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In the Supreme Court 
of the_ State of Utah 
STATE OF CT AH~ by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
VS~ 
]. HOWARD VALENTINE and 
FLORENCE S.V ALENTI~F~ 
Defendants, 
WESTERN STATES REFINING COM-
PAl'\Y, a Corporation, 
Intetv(::ning Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No~ 
9100 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT 0 F THE CASE 
The intervenor admits that the plaintiffs statement of the 
case is substantially correct. However, exception is taken to 
the second para graph of the statement) wherein the plain tiff 
alleges that the court granted plaintiff immediate occupancy 
of the premises. This V/as not the fact or the case. The order 
shows that the plaintiff was given the right to occupy the 
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premises \~· henev er the I and V/ as needed fo c construction 
( R. 9) . The occupancy by the plaintiff did not take place 
Wl til three years and three month after the signing of the order 
of occupancy. 
STATEAfENT OF FACTS 
The intervenor admits that the plaintiff's statement of 
facts is subs tan tiall y correct, except as to the £ ollo~vin g par-
ticulars. 
lvlr. Valentine, one of the defendants, was in court in the 
capacity of a party de£ endant and not in any other capacity 
w hatsoevcr. 
Mr. Wagstaff \Vas in court in the capacity of a practicing 
a ttoi n ey .and one of the defendants' counsels~ and not in any 
other capacity whatsoever. 
Plaintiff~s comment in its statement of facts, that Mr. 
Valentine and Mr. Wagstaff, nboth being present in court and 
both agreed [() the order of the court~ not on I y by silence and 
acq uicscence ~ but by constructive and actl ve participation there-
in~'' is a r gum en tive, improper, an incorrect statement of the 
facts, and a conclusion of the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE. The intervenor is not bound by the order 
of occupancy under the provisions of the -due process of 1 aw 
clause of the Constitution of Utah. 
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POINT TWO. 1'he intervenor was entitled to intervene 
into the action as a matter of right, and the trial court did not 
err in permitting the ~ntervention. 
POINT THREE. The intervenor is not bound by any order 
or proceeding 1 n tb e action made prior to the date of inter-
veotion~ 
POINT FOUR. The value of intervcnorts leasehold in-
terest is fixed as of the date of the order allo,ving intervention. 
POINT FIVE. Plaintiff had actual notice of the lease 
between the de£ enda.n ts and the intervenor~ 
POINT SIX. Plaintiff, by its conduct, is barred from plead-
ing equitable estoppel. 
POINT SEVEN. The intervenor is entitled to just com-
pensation for its lea5ehold interest in the property condemned. 
POINT EIGHT~ There is sufficient evidence upon which 
the trial court based j t s j udgm en t ~ and as a m.a tter of Ia w the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE IKTERVENOR IS t\OT BOUND BY THE ORDER 
OF OCCUPANCY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUa 
TJON OF UTAH. 
It is undisputed and admitted that the_intcrvenor was not 
served with process in the condemnation proceedings and that 
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s urn mons was not issued or served naming the Western States 
Refining Company as a patt}T to the action. The record further. 
shows that no service of process was made by publication or 
other constructive service methods .. 
The Constitution of Utah provides: 
nNo person shaH be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law.'~ 
Constitution of (; tah 
Art~ I, Sec. 7 
The Supre1ne Court of Utah ruled in the case of Parry 
v~ Bonneville Irr. Dist., 0.71 G. 202, 263 P~ 751: 
·~It is of course an elementary rule of law that there 
can be no judicial action affecting vested rights that is 
not based upon some process or notice where by the 
interested parties are brought \Vithin the jurisdiction 
of the judicial tribunal about to render judgment.~' 
The Rul cs of Civil Procedure set £ orth how an action ~rill 
be commenced and when th c court obtains jurisdiction~ Rule 3, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states : 
~~Commencement of Action. (a) Ho,v commenced. 
A civil action is commenced ( l ) by filing a com plaint 
with the court~ or ( 2) by service of a summons. * * * 
(c) Time of Jurisdiction. The court shall have juris-
diction from the time of £ling the com plaint or service 
of summons." 
Rule 10 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
't * * * in the complaint the titJc of the action shall 
include the names of all the parties~ * * * ,, 
The com plaint in this action does not name the Western 
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States Refining Company~ the inter"enor., as a party to the 
action (R. 1) ~ 
The plain tiff now states that the intervenor is bound as 
a party to the action because of the presence of some of the 
officers of the intervenor in the courtroom at the time of the 
hearing on the order o£ immediate occupancy. 
The Court stated in the case of State v. Telford~ 93 U. 
228~ 72 P.2d 626: 
t tThe re are many cases where courts have juris diction 
of a subject matter but that jurisdiction must be in· 
voked a ceo rding to a certain procedure. In invoking 
the jurisdiction of the district court on matters wherein 
it has original jurisdiction~ it requires a com plaint, peti-
tion, or application. One cannot invoke the jurisdiction 
by simply stating orally onets complaint.~~ 
The Utah court in the case of Naisbitt v + Herrick, 7 6 U ~ 
575, 290 P+ 950, ruled: 
HDue process of law requires that before one can be 
bound by a judgment affecting his property right, some 
process must be served upon him which in some degree 
at I east is calculated to give him notice. j ~ (Tim phasis 
ours.) 
The record sho·ws that not only was summon5 not served 
upon the intervenor, but that the intervenor ~Tas not named 
as a party to the action in the complaint. The Second Judicial 
District Court in .and for Davis County~ Utah, did not have 
j wisdiction over the Western States Refining Company, the 
intervenor~ until December 13 ~ 19 5 S ~ and any orders, decrees~ 
rulings or judgments made prior to that date were a nullity 
as to the Western States Refining Company. 
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POINT TWO 
'fHE INTERVENOR WAS ENTJTLFD TO INTER. 
\ 1El\E ll'\TO TilE ACTION AS A lviATTER Of RIGHT~ 
AND THE TRll\.L COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT· 
TIKG THE INTERVENTION. 
The plaintin asserts in the :fir.st pojnt of its brief that the 
court erred in aJlov..'ing the Western States Refining Company 
to in t erv en e in this action. In making such an assertion, the 
Road Commission disregards the legislative enactments of 
the Utah L e gi sl atu re) ~r hich passed a Ia w setting forth who is 
entitled to .int erven c as a party to a condem nation suit. 
· (tWho tna y appear and defend.~All persons in occu · 
patio n of or having or cta.irn ing an interest in~ any of 
the property des.cr ibed in the cotn p 1 a 1 n t, or in the 
damages for the taking thereof, though not named, 
tna y appear~ plead and defend, each in res pcct to his 
own property or intere-St, or that claimed by bitn~ in 
the ~arne rnanner as if named i_n the complaint~~ 
78-34-7, Utah Code Annotatedl 1953 
The position taken by the state~ relating to the right of the 
intervenor to in te rv ene and pro teet i t5 property rights, is 
incomprehensible in '=it\\' of the provisions of the statute just 
quoted. 
PO ll\'1' T'HREE 
THE INTERVENOR IS NOT BOUND BY A:t\Y ORDER 
OR PROCEEDING l N THE ACTION MADE PRIOR TO 
THE DATE OF INTERVENTION. 
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The plain tiff asserts in the first point of its br lef that the 
intenenor is bowtd by the order of occupancy made by the 
court on the 29th day of August, 195 2 (R. 9) . The record 
shows that the Western States Refining Company did not 
become a party to the action until the 13th day of December, 
1955 (R. 13). 
Under no stretch of the due process clause of the Con~ 
stitution or of the imagination could the intervenor be said 
to have been a party to the action at the time of the hearing 
on the order of occupancy. The mere fact that the president of 
the intervenor) Mr. W. S. Wagstaff, was in the courtroom 
does not make the corporation a party to the action. At that 
time Mr .. Wagstaff was a practicing attorney~at-law and a 
member of the bar of this state. His being made counsel of 
record for the defendants (the Valentines)) cannot be said 
to be an act which would give the court juris diction over the 
corporation. 
The plain tiff asserts that the corporation received benefits 
from the order of occupancy .and therefore it is estopped from 
claiming any damages from the taking of the land~ 
The defendants could not bind the intervenor by any 
representations or stipulations that they chose to make. Insofar 
as the order of occupancy is concerned, it was a mere io ter-
lorutory order~ State v. Danielson! 122 U. 220, 247 P.2d 900~ 
and the defendants, or the intervenor after it came into the . 
action, had it been affected by the order, could attack the 
order and the grounds for its issuance. Utah Copper Co. v. 
Montana Bingham Consol. Mining Co., 69 Ur 423, 255 P. 672r 
.9 
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After reviewing the record, there are serious doubts that,· 
if con tested, th c courtj s order allowing occupancy would have 
been sustained. The State's O\v n \Vi tness testified in August, 
1952, at th~ hearing on Immediate Occupancy: 
J.\.Ir. Health: ~· * * * \X'e noted che activity on this· 
land and the main reason for asking for the order of 
im1nediatc occupancy is we didn't \V ant to enhance the 
value the state would have to buy in the future by 
buying out a business 7' ~ 
R~39~ Tr. 0. 0~., p~ge 7 
The record continues: 
Mr. lvcrson: t~Isn~t this the case, L\lr. Heath, the only 
reason this order of oc<.:upancy is asked for is because 
the defend ants here have been imp roving the property 
and have gone ahead with the use of it?" 
Mr. Heath: n .. fhat is the main reason." 
R· 39~ Tr .. 0. 0.~ page 9 
The court granted the order of immediate occupancy~ but 
carefully granted the defendants the right to use the land and 
occupy it until the state needed the land fo'r the road (R. 39, 
Tr. 0. 0.~ page 20, 21). The court by direct implication recog~ 
nized that the State did not need the land at that time nor 
v..Tould it neecl it for some time to come, but entered the order 
so that it ·would be unnecessary for the parties to come back 
.at a later time. 
\X1 hi l e it is discretionary Vt~"i th the court to grant an order 
of immediate occupancy, there should be a showing of the neces-
sity. for a speedy occupation of· the land. Utah Copper Co. 
v. lvlontana Bingham Consol. J\1in. Co., 69 U. 423~ 255 P. 672~ 
It is cl c J. r from the record that there was no necessity for an 
10 
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immediate occupation of the property. The plaintiff alleges 
that the intervenor acquired benefits by this order. What 
benefits? 
POINT FOUR 
THE VALUE OF It\TERVENORtS LEASEHOLD IN-
TEREST IS FIXED AS OF THE DATE OF THE ORDER 
ALLOWING INTERVENTION. 
The p 1 a in tiff asserts in the third and sixth points of its 
brief that the value of the leasehold interest is fixed as of the 
date of the summons. 
The in terv en or admits that this is correct and is the statu-
tory law~ insofar as it pertains to those upon whom the sum-
mons is served. 
Tb e 1 a w of this State is clear and definite that a party 
having an interest in land being condemned) but who is not 
a party to the suit) is not bound by that summons and that the 
value of the interest taken i-s fixed as of the date of the inter-
vention of that party into the action4 
The plain tiff~ State of ·utah J has the burden and the duty 
of bringing in eath and every party it seeks to bind by the 
condemnation suit, and the rights of those who are ignored 
and who are not brought in as proper parties to the action 
cannot be bound by any orders or decrees rendered by the 
court in the matter. This has been cone 1 usi vel y sett 1 ed in the 
cases of Oregon S. L. & l7. N. Ry+ Co. v. Mitchell~ 7 U. S 10~ 
27 P+ 693, and Ogden L. & L Ry~ Co. v~ Jones) 51 U. 62~ 168 
P. 548. In the latter case the Utah Court said: 
11 
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Fit is also admitted that v.~here a summons is not 
served, the time at which the value of the land and 
the damages must be determined under our statute i~ 
the date on VoJThich the landowner enters his appearance 
in the action. ~ t 
The Supreme Court of LTtah ruJcd in the case of Brigham 
City v. Chase~ 3? 1!~ 410, 85 P. 436: 
... Where such persons are not all named as parties 
or not served, the judgment of condemnation will 
simply be a nulJity as to those o1nitte(L" 
ln the B r ~gha1n City case, the court goes on to say that the 
condemnors 't proceeds at their peril~~ where they have not 
named all the parties to the action or served them with process+ 
As the \\-'estern St~tes Refining Company did not become 
a party to the action until December 13~ 1955 (R. 13)! as 
a matter of la\v damages must be assessed as of that date. 
POINT FIVE 
.PLAINTIFF HAD ACTIIAL NOTJCE.OF THE LEASE 
BErwrEEN THE DE.FEJ:\'DANTS AKD THE INTER-
VENOR. 
In point three of pJ.aintifr s brief, it alleges that it was 
the duty of the intervenor to come into the action, as it had 
actual notice of the proceedings. This argument is diametrically 
opposed to the theory adopted in point one of its brieC 'vherein 
it asslerts. that the intervenor should not have been permitted 
to come .into the case at alL 
As the State of Utah commenced the action~ it "vas its 
duty to bring in all the parties it sought to bind by the pro-
12 
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ceedings. The intervenor was under no 1 egal duty to come into 
the case at all. 
The plaintiff had actual notice of the existence . of the 
lease at the time of the hearing on the order of occupancy~ 
by the te~timony of Mr. \-'a]entinc, 'vho nqt only stated that 
there was a lease, but gave its terms and conditions (R. 39, 
TL 0. 0., page 12). The State recei:ved a land appraisal (In-
tervenor's Exhibit No~ 1) filed by Mr. Werner Keipe~ ·~·hich 
set forth in detail the ex.is tenc e of the lease. The q ues ti ort 
that the plain till I eaves u nan sw c red in its bric f is: Why did 
not the State of Utah bring in the intervenor as a proper 
party to the· action in 1952 after it had actual notice of the 
existence of the lease bet~veen the \'?estern States Refining 
Company and the defendants~ Valentines ? 
. . The plain tiff had further notice of the lease by the fact 
t~at the intervenor \\··as in P?ssession of the property from 
the early part of August, 1952, up to the time that the ~tate 
took possession in December, 19 55. 
Possession is actual notice of an interest in the title to 
land. Meagh~r v. Dean~ 97 U. 173, 91 P.2d 454; Toland V~ 
Corey, 6 ·u_. 392~ 24 P.190 (affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court, 154 U+ S. 499~ 38 L.EJr 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144). 
In this latter case, the Utah Court said: 
"\Xre think the better doctrine is that an occupant's 
possession is actual notice of. ~i~ ti tJ c, and all persons 
with notice of such possession rnust at their peril take 
notice . of his fu 11 ti tJ e in the premises, no difference 
what the record shows.'' 
Utah law does not require that a] J [eases be put on record, 
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and it is a well recognized fact in the business world that the 
vast rna jo ri ty of leases executed are not placed on record. 
Plain tiff asserts that the 1 ease was a mere executory 1 ease. 
This is not the case~ and the record so shows that this was an 
executed and delivered lease~ 
The I ease had been executed by the parties on April 10, 
1952 (Tr. Trans. dated November 7~ 1956~ page 23, Defs 
Exhibit No. 1, Lease). The lessors, Valentines, the defendants, 
had bound themselves. to build a gasoline station according 
to the plans and s pecifi.cations attached to the lease, and they 
had in fact substantially completed the station prior to the 
hearing on the order of occupancy. Plaintiff admits this in 
its brief in its £ ourth point. Both parties were bound by the 
lease and neither party could breach the lease without the 
incur renee o £ a legal liability. The on! y thing that ~·as 
executory about the lease wa.s the exact date upon which the 
rental commenced to run. The term of the lease had already 
commenced to run prior to the hearing on the order of occu · 
pancy. 
Plain tiff makes the observation that the plans and s peci-
:fica tions were not attached to the 1 ease~ and, by innuendo, 
attempts to cast some doubt upon the lease. The record shows 
that no demand for the plans and specifications was ever made 
by the plaintiff, and had such a demand been made the plans 
would have been produced. 
The plaintiff a.ll e g es that not only \Vas the I ease executory, 
but that the intervenor did not have a vested right in the prop-
erty. This is not the fact nor the law .. In the case of Ewert 
14 
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v .. Robinson, -CCA 8th ( 1923), 289 F~ 740~ 35 A~L.R. 219). 
the Circuit Court said: 
nit is no longer necessary to go upon land, as in the 
Jays of old and receive a t"tvig or a t:lod of dirt as a 
token of changed possession. The delivery of the deed 
or lease accomplishes the same thing, and in a much ··· 
less cumbersotne manner~·~ 
. Warvelle, in his work on Ejectment, Sec. 156; states: 
nAn estate for years is both created and perfected by 
· the execution and delivery of a lease for the term~ and 
such lease~ 'vhlle it confers no rights of ownership) 
does c~rry a right to the possession and pro.fi ts of the 
land.)! 
I 
Where a lease has been ex€cuted \Vit~ authority and it is 
prima facie tbe act of the pa~ties~ it is entitled to introduc~or:_ .. 
to show the right to possession of the land. Tarpey v. Dcseret 
Salt Co., S U. 205~ 14 P+ 338. 
The plain tiff cites a n u 1nber of ca sc s d cfin in g cxecu tory 
interests, but it is to be ·noted in rea ding the cases that they 
all pertain to buy-sell agreements dealing \vith personal prop~ 
erty~ to wit: stoves, barrel stave5, cotton~ wagons and buggies~ 
and baled hay. · 
POINT SIX 
_PLAINTIFF, RY ITS CONDIJCT, IS BARRED FROM 
PLEADING EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Plaintiff, throughout its brief, seeks to interject equitable 
reliefs· a. gains t the intervenor by pleading csto ppel.· The w riter.s 
of this brief believe that it is unnecessary to cite authority for 
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the nclean hands doctrine't of equity which requires one who 
seeks equity to do equity_. 
The evidence sho\vs that the State of Utah, until the time 
that the defendants, pursuant to the terms of the lease~ com-
menced to construct the service station, had no intention of 
condemning any land in the vicinity of the property in question. 
Mr. Heath) right ·Of-way engineer for the state, testi£ ed 
that the only reason the state took the land was that the 
defendants had started to build improvements on their property! 
and the state did not want any landowners to enhance the 
value of their land (R. 39, Tr. 0. 0.~ pages 7~ 8, 9). He further 
testified that the state had not condemned any other land and 
that the state would negotiate w lth all other landowners before 
filing suit (R. 39, TrT Or 0., page 8). 
The conduct of the State of LTtah throughout the entire 
1 aw suit has been such that it cannot now plead the defense of 
equity. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE INTERVENOR IS ENTITLED TO JUST COM-
PENSATION FOR ITS LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN THe 
PROPERTY CONDEMNED~ 
The State of Utah Road Commission has attempted to 
seize and take the interest of the Intervenor without just 
compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States and Constitution of Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court~ in the case of U. S .. 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S~ 3 73, 65 S~ Ct. 357, 89 L. 
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Ed." 311) 156 A.L.R~ 390, after ruling that the taking of property 
without just compensation is violative of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, stated: 
"When it (U. S. Government) takes the property~ 
that is) the fee~ the lease~ whatever he may own, ter· 
minating altogether his interest, under the established 
law it must pay him for Vv~hat is taken * * * ."' 
The Constitution of the State of l}tah states: 
~~Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use Vl i thou t just com pen sa tion.'' 
Art. 1~ Sec. 22t 
Constitution of Utah 
To deny the intervenor just cotnpensa tion for the value of 
its ·leasehold interest v.~ould be to violate all of the constitu-
tional sa£ e guards tha ~ our forefathers s ccured for us in the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah. 
The California court reccntlyJ in the case of Charlestrom 
v. Lyon Van and Storage Company ( 1957) ~ 313 P~2d 645~ 
rejected an attempt to deny a leas eho 1 der compensation for its 
leasehold interest. In that case~ the lcssorJ knov{ing of the im-
pef,ldin g condemnation~ served the 1 e.ssee v{i t h notice of te rmi-
nation for alleged violations of the lease, so that he could 
claim all of the damages "i;Vhich v..·ere to be a\varded for himself. 
Tbe court rejected this scheme and v.ren t on to say: 
~ ~ 0 r dina ril y Vl h c n the gover nm en t condemns 1 eased 
property thereby taking title to the ~·hole property in 
fee the lease is obliterated, and, in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary~ the parties to the Jease are 
each entitled to compensation for the taking of their 
respective rights. t t 
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POINT EIGHT 
THERE IS Sl~FFIQENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS JUDG.t\{ENT, AND AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFfiRMED. 
~~It is recommended that the State Road Commission 
make sure 1n its settlement 'vith tbe present o~vners~ 
that satisfactory settlement is also made with the ten· 
ant.'J 
I nterveno rt s Exhibit No. 1 
Report of Werner Keipe 
The above quotation is fro1n the a ppralsal report of Mr. 
Kcipe. At the time the statement was made by Mr. Keipe, he 
was employed by the plaintiff to make an appraisal of the 
land ln question for the pi a in tiff. The State now seeks to sh01\' 
that Mr r Keipc placed no value upon the leasehold interest. 
The entire hypothesis upon which the State relies to show 
that the leasehold in tc rest had no value is based upon the 
thea ry of ~v·h at would a buyer give for land knowing that it 
was about to be condemned~ 
The method of computing compensation generally in 
condemnation suits is the "fair market value" of the land or 
the leasehold taken. 
The court) in the recent case of V ronti k is Brothers vs. 
State, -~r· U. 2d ____ , ____ P .2d ____ , observed: 
n * * * The accepted formula for determining fair 
market value rs * * * .;vhat would a purchaser wj lling 
18 
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to buy but not required to do so, pay and what \vould 
a se Her \\' illi ng to se 11 but not required to do so ask.' .. 
By adding the condition of nknowledge of impending 
condemnationJ~ a fair 1narket value could not be arrived at. Mr. 
Keipe's entire testimony of the leasehold interest having no 
value was predicated upon the assumption that the land would 
be condemned in the immediate future (Tr. Trans. dated 
March 11~ 1959 (pages 8, 9, 10). When Mr. Kcipe~ on cross 
examination~ removed the hypothesis of impending condem-
nation) he a.rrlved at a value of the leasehold~ based upon the 
statlon~s sale of gasoline during 1953, 1954 and 1955, under 
one theory of computation, of $6~000.00 (Tr. Trans. dated 
March 11, 1959l page 17) and under another theory of com· 
putation, of $23,325.00 (Tr. Trans. dated March 11, 1959, 
page 19) ~ 
The record contains substantial evidence of the market 
value of the leasehold interest which l'uns from $6~000. 00 
(Tr. Trans~ dated March 11, 1959, page 17) to $40,000.00 
(Tr. Trans~ dated February 4, 1959) page 11). 
4-.The measure of damages for leasehoJd interest 
taken under eminent domain has been decJared gen-
erally to be the fair market value of the leasehold or 
unexpired term of the lease.,, 
3 A~L.R. 2d 290 
Annotator's comment~ citing cases 
In determining the ·value of the Jeasehold interest~ it is 
not always an easy thing to ascertain \Vith exactness what the 
ufair market valuet' is. 
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Hleaseholds are not ordinarily the subject of sale on 
the market, and vary so much in the length of terrn1 
rent, and other particulars, including the nature of the 
pro pcrty J etnis ed, and its particular use by tbe 1 essee, 
that appJying tnarket value as the criterion for de-
termining the v aJ ue of the leas eho 1 d rna y ~ in some a rL 
cumstances:t be impossi blc or might produce inequitable 
results+') Ed. . 1 S ttona ummary 
3 A.L.R. 2d 289 
In line with this reasoning, the intervenor introduced 
additionaJ evidence other than that of the value of the lease-
hal d interest based on the fair market vaJ ue. This evidence 
\vas to the profits that the leased property made during the 
period of time of the opera. tion of the b uslness from 19 52 
up to the time of the taking .ln December, 195 5. 
4 ~where it appears that the property condemned is 
of sut.:h a nature that the profits derived from its use 
are the entire or chief source of its value, evidence of 
the amount of the profits is to be considered in deter~ 
mining the market value.~,. 
Annotator's comment, 7 A.L~R. 171, 
Gting cases 
Considering the profits of the business and the resulting 
loss of pro£ ts from the taking as the means of determining 
market value, the evidence shows a value up to $68) 720.00 
(Tr. Trans. dated March 11~ 1959, page 42) + 
The Supreme Court of the ljnited States., in the case of 
C. S. v. Genelal Motors Corp., cited previously~ stated; 
~ .. In the ordinary case, for \\'ant of a better standard, 
market value~ so called, is the criterion of that value. 
In some cases this criterion cannot be used either because 
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the interest condemned has no market value or because" 
in the circun1stances., market value furnishes an inaE~ 
proprlate measure of actual value.·:> 
The intervenor furnished the court with substantial evi-
dence of the value of the leasehold interest~ based on market 
value and the loss of profits resulting from the taking. The 
oourfs judgment awarding na just compensation" in com-
pliance with the Constitution and based upon the evidence 
was correct, and as a matter of law, the judgment should be 
affirmed. , 
SUMMARY 
Intervenor is entitled to ~·just compensation'' for the taking 
of its leasehold interest on the property condemned by the 
plaintiff and the trial court's judgment should be affirmed~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorney,r for Inter~·enor 
and Respondent 
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